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ABSTRACT 
Until nowadays, the scientific community firmly rejected the Theory of Inheritance of Acquired 
Characteristics, a theory mostly associated with the name of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1774-1829). 
Though largely dismissed when applied to biological organisms, this theory found its place in a young 
discipline called Artificial Life. Based on the two abstract models of Darwinian and Lamarckian 
evolutionary theories built using neural networks and genetic algorithms, this research aims to 
present a notion of the potential impact of implementation of Lamarckian knowledge inheritance 
across disciplines. In order to obtain our results, we conducted a focus group discussion between 
experts in biology, computer science and philosophy, and used their opinions as qualitative data in 
our research. As a result of completing the above procedure, we have found some implications of 
such implementation in each mentioned discipline. In synthetic biology, this means that we would 
engineer organisms precisely up to our specific needs. At the moment, we can think of better drugs, 
greener fuels and dramatic changes in chemical industry. In computer science, Lamarckian 
evolutionary algorithms have been used for quite some years, and quite successfully. However, their 
application in strong ALife can only be approximated based on the existing roadmaps of futurists. In 
philosophy, creating artificial life seems consistent with nature and even God, if there is one. At the 
same time, this implementation may contradict the concept of free will, which is defined as the 
capacity for an agent to make choices in which the outcome has not been determined by past events. 
This study has certain limitations, which means that larger focus group and more prepared 
participants would provide more precise results. 
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The behavior of natural organisms in the real world is not fixed across their lifespan. Through 
interactions with the environment, they gain experience and develop a tendency to repeat the 
actions that bring pleasure or benefit, and to avoid those that lead to danger or pain.  
At the same time, organisms are not born in a blank state – they develop according to the 
information in their genes, which are inherited from the ancestors and selected through the struggle 
for existence (Sasaki and Tokoro, 2000). 
However, only what is inborn in their own heritage can be transferred along with their genes. 
The acquired characters will not be encoded in the genes, and therefore will not be directly passed to 
the offspring – according to Darwinism, all the knowledge that biological organisms have gained 
should be developed over again by each new generation.  
Here a simple question arises: what if living beings could get past this limitation? What if 
children could pick up where parents left off developing their expertise, health, coordination and 
reflexes, each generation building on the last to reach out for higher and higher goals?  
This attractive, although hypothetic process is called Lamarckian inheritance, a long-
discredited mechanism of evolution. Through learning, individuals would experience certain adaptive 
changes and acquire new traits that would be directly transmitted to their offspring. Although it was 
largely dismissed as a valid theory for natural systems, Lamarckian evolution found its place and 
proven effective within computer applications (Ross, 1999).  
But science moves ahead, and in the nearest future, the implementation of Lamarckian 
evolution may turn into something bigger that just a cybernetic adventure. Even though our 
commonly accepted definition of life does not yet recognize any current simulations or applications 
as alive, it may not always stay that way. The opinions regarding this matter vary, but according to 
the strong ALife position, first introduced by Neumann in 1963, life can be abstracted away from any 
particular medium. 
In this research, we are going to evaluate the potential impact of the implementation of 
Lamarckian evolution, in particular, of the inheritance of skills and knowledge, given the possibility of 
creating life within computational environment. Instead of being just an engineering problem, it 
becomes a cross-disciplinary topic that creates numerous philosophical questions and implications. 
In order to demonstrate that it is possible to implement Lamarckian evolution in a 
computational environment, we refer to previously created models and present our own, where a 
neural network is regarded as a learnable individual (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986), and genetic 
algorithms (Holland, 1975) are applied to the population of such individuals based on mechanisms of 
natural evolutionary processes and genetics. Using a focus group of researchers from computer 
science, biology and philosophy, we have validated the model and evaluated its potential impact on 
different matters in our lives, including technology, ethics, life and society.  
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1.1. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829) and Charles Darwin (1809-1882) both contemplated and 
developed ideas about how life on earth evolved to be the way it is now. They both believed that 
living things change to be better fit and adapted to their environments, and that all organisms relate 
to one another. 
Lamarck’s Theory of Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics, first described in his work 
“Philosophie Zoologique” in 1809, implied that the adaptive changes that species may undergo 
through interactions with the environment are passed on to their offspring and later generations. In 
the classic example, the giraffe obtained its long neck by stretching to reach higher branches. This 
stretching experience was further transmitted to future generations with each getting a slightly 
longer neck. In other words, the species was being directly changed by its interaction with the 
environment. 
Darwin, on the contrary, in his Theory of Evolution, published in his book “On the Origin of 
Species” in 1859, stated that the offspring are born with their parents' beneficial traits, and as they 
reproduce, individuals with that trait make up more of the population, while less adapted individuals 
die off. He introduced a plausible mechanism called natural selection, that acts to preserve and 
accumulate minor advantageous genetic mutations. If a specimen develops a functional advantage, 
e.g. grows wings and learns to fly, its offspring would inherit that advantage and pass it on to their 
offspring. The inferior (disadvantaged) members of the same species would gradually die out, leaving 
only the superior (advantaged) members of the species (Sharma, 2010). 
Darwin's Theory of Evolution has been supported by evidence from a wide variety of 
scientific disciplines, and Lamarck's Theory of Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics has been 
proven wrong, even though modern research in the emerging field of genetics called epigenetics has 
shown that Lamarck may have been at least partially correct all along (Springer and Holley, 2013). 
The mainstream of modern evolutionary theory follows Darwinism and denies the possibility of 
direct inheritance of acquired traits (Sasaki and Tokoro, 2000).  
Nevertheless, artificial organisms would reproduce in a completely different manner than 
biological, under at least partial conscious control, giving it a Lamarckian component (Farmer and 
Belin, 1990). Unlike life in the natural world, computer programs use uncomplicated transformations 
between genotypes and phenotypes, and the inversion of phenotypes to their corresponding 
genotypes is often manageable. In certain cases, where genotypes are their own phenotypes, no 
transformation is needed at all. The significance of this with respect to Lamarckian evolution is that it 
is possible to optimize a phenotype in the context of a particular problem environment, and have this 
optimization represented in a corresponding genotype for succeeding inheritance by offspring (Ross, 
1999).  
Considering the technology trends and the history of humanity, our evolution provides 
evidence that humans will one day create machines more intelligent than they are. The reasons to 
believe in the creation of a conscious machine include the exponential increase of computational 
capacity of computers, automatic knowledge acquisition and algorithms like recursion, neural 
networks, and genetic algorithms (Kurzweil, 1999). Kurzweil predicts the machines will appear to 
have their own free will and even spiritual experiences. 
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If the inception of strong AI and strong ALife is near, the implementation of Lamarckian 
inheritance may impact our lives in different domains, from technological applications to 
philosophical and ethical concerns. The problem being addressed here is how exactly this 
implementation can influence various disciplines and what it can potentially lead to. In this research, 
we will give a special attention to the possible future role of knowledge inheritance by the 
Lamarckian scheme in engineering, biology, philosophy and ethics. 
 
1.2. STUDY RELEVANCE AND JUSTIFICATION 
Throughout the history, scientists have studied evolution for the same reasons that they have 
learned any other discipline — the thirst for knowledge, the desire to understand the past and 
predict the future, and the necessity to organize our world. Evolution, especially the understanding 
of how organisms evolve through natural selection, has always been an area of science with various 
practical applications (Bull and Wichman, 2001).  
But nowadays, with the emergence of artificial intelligence, computational neuroscience and 
transhumanism, evolutionary studies have acquired fundamentally different ethical and social 
significance that extends beyond simple curiosity. Already existing roadmap on whole brain 
emulation (Sandberg and Bostrom, 2008) attempts to achieve software intelligence by copying the 
function of biological nervous systems into software. This approach produces numerous ethical 
issues that should affect responsible policy for developing the field. Animal emulations have 
controversial moral status, and a principle of analogy is suggested for judging treatment of virtual 
animals. Various considerations of developing and utilizing human brain emulations are discussed 
(Sandberg, 2014). 
Among the latest published books, taking inspiration from self-awareness in humans, the 
new notion of computational self-awareness as a fundamental concept for designing and operating 
computing systems has been introduced (Lewis et al., 2016). The basic ability of such self-aware 
computing systems is to gather information about their state and progress, learning and maintaining 
models containing knowledge that enables them to reason about their behavior. Self-aware 
computing systems will have the ability to utilize this knowledge to effectively and autonomously 
adapt and explain their behavior in dynamic environments. 
Although the accuracy of predictions of future developments in AI and ALife is difficult to 
evaluate, according to Ray Kurzweil himself, 89 out of 108 predictions he made so far were entirely 
correct by the end of 2009. An additional 13 were what he calls “essentially correct" (meaning that 
they were likely to be realized within a few years of 2009), for a total of 102 out of 108. Another 3 
are partially correct, 2 look like they are about 10 years off, and 1, which was tongue in cheek 
anyway, was just wrong (Wang, 2010).  
While at present, whole brain emulation seems an unfeasibly ambitious challenge, the 
necessary computing power and various scanning methods are rapidly developing. Large-scale 
computational brain models are a very active research area, at present reaching the size of 
mammalian nervous systems (Djurfeldt et al., 2008; Eliasmith et al., 2012; Markram, 2006; Preissl et 
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al., 2012). Whole brain emulation can be considered the logical endpoint of current trends in 
computational neuroscience and systems biology (Sandberg, 2014). 
The implementation of Lamarckian evolution in future ALife systems such as virtual lab 
animals has wide practical application across disciplines. We have examined the trends and role of 
such evolution in engineering, computational biology and ethics, and based on this analysis, came to 
several assumptions that are to be evaluated by the focus group. 
 
1.2.1. Current application in engineering 
In a dynamic and unpredictable environment such as real world, it is very difficult to construct 
intelligent machines or computer programs that would perfectly manage to produce desirable results 
from the very beginning. Therefore, an approach based on adaptive computation or evolutionary 
computation, where programs adapt themselves towards given situations through generating and 
testing, gained its popularity and significance (Sasaki and Tokoro, 2000).  
Simulations of evolution using evolutionary algorithms originate from the work of Barricelli in 
the 1960s, continued by Fraser, who published a series of papers on simulation of artificial selection 
(Fraser, 1958). As a result of the work of Rechenberg, who used evolution strategies in the 1960s and 
early 1970s to solve complex engineering problems, artificial evolution became a widely recognized 
optimization method (Rechenberg, 1973). Genetic algorithms in particular became well-known 
through the writing of Holland (1975). As academic interest grew, dramatic increases in the power of 
computers allowed practical applications, including the automatic evolution of software (Koza, 1992). 
Evolutionary algorithms are now applied in solving multi-dimensional problems more efficiently than 
computer programs developed by human designers, and also to optimize the design of systems 
(Jamshidi, 2003). 
A research area called artificial life (Langton, 1989) is a typical example that analyzes 
mathematical aspects of the dynamics residing in life in a synthetic way and tries to apply principles 
of natural systems (ranging from swarms of cells to human societies) as models for possible novel 
methods of adaptive computation. In software-based artificial life, neural networks are often applied 
in modeling the brain of an agent. Although traditionally more of an artificial intelligence technique, 
neural nets can be used for simulating population dynamics of organisms with an ability to learn 
(Kumar and Bhatnagar, 2010). Genetic algorithms are applied to such populations based on 
evolutionary and genetic mechanisms. 
Due to the biological background, earlier attempts of artificial life modeling have always 
focused on a Darwinian evolution, based on competition of artificial beings in a computational 
environment, where new artificial organisms would appear only as the result of combining 
morphology of parents (Hinton and Nowlan, 1987). Until nowadays, Darwin’s evolutionary models 
have been widely used in different scientific fields. Many of such implementations were motivated 
by the idea of constructing practical devices that have some of the useful features of living systems, 
such as robustness, flexibility, and autonomy (Bedau, 2002). 
At the same time, from the engineering point of view, it is not necessary to consider only 
Darwinian models. The possibility of heredity of acquired characteristics can be quite useful, and 
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several studies have already shown the significant increase in performance of problem-solving 
systems using Lamarckian scheme (Grefenstette et al., 1990; Davidor, 1991).  
In evolutionary algorithms, the implementation of Lamarckian inheritance means that an 
individual can modify its genetic code during or after fitness evaluation, or lifetime. This idea has 
been used in several studies with particular success in problems where the application of a local 
search operator obtains a substantial improvement, e.g. traveling salesman problem (Ross, 1999). 
The effectiveness and superiority of Lamarckian evolutionary algorithm has also been demonstrated 
for fixed tasks in stationary environments, even though Darwinian population adapts better to 
dynamic environments (Sasaki and Tokoro, 2000). 
 
1.2.2. Some later findings in computational biology 
Relatively recent research in cell biology has shown that the internal chemistry of living cells is a form 
of computation (Bray, 2011). Such ideas are currently breaking boundaries between scientific 
disciplines and give rise to interdisciplinary sciences like computational biology, which involves the 
development and application of data-analytical and theoretical methods, mathematical modeling 
and computational simulation techniques to the study of biological, behavioral, and social systems 
(Huerta et al., 2000). 
A wetware computer is an organic computer (also known as an artificial organic brain or a 
neurocomputer) built from living neurons. Professor Ditto, at the Georgia Institute of Technology, is 
the primary researcher driving the creation of these artificially constructed, but still organic brains. 
One prototype is constructed from leech neurons, and is capable of performing simple arithmetic 
operations. The concepts are still being researched and prototyped, but in the near future, it is 
expected that artificially constructed organic brains, even though they are still considerably simpler 
in design than animal brains, should be capable of simple pattern recognition tasks such as 
handwriting recognition (Borresen and Lynch, 2009). 
At the same time, while originally dismissed as non-feasible, Lamarckian evolution now 
appears more and more in biological systems ranging from microbes to mammals, and molecular 
mechanisms that might realize this mode of inheritance are being clarified. Epigenetics, a set of 
means to propagate a phenotypic change across generations, appears to provide a set of feasible 
molecular means that may realize Lamarckism. In addition, several mechanisms exist which may 
allow the phenotype to instruct the genotype at a given environment. Recent advances in molecular 
evolution have been surveyed and realistic means have been presented to engineer Lamarckian 
organisms in the lab which might possess improved evolvability (Pilpel, 2016). 
 
1.2.3. New significance in philosophy and ethics 
Computational biology gives one the sense that we are at the threshold of yet another of 
civilization's "Spinoza moments" where the entire framework for thinking about life is dramatically, 
and irrevocably restructured.  The idea that cellular membranes and contents may be functional 
equivalents of computers does not appear strange and implausible any longer. And even if the 
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implementation of strong ALife is a matter of future, considering potential risks and their ethical 
impacts is an important aspect of research ethics, even when dealing with merely possible future 
radical technologies (Sandberg, 2014). 
Evolutionary studies have provided us better understanding of ourselves and helped us find 
our own place on Earth with 1.8 million identified species, and possibly 10 million total species. The 
context of evolution gives an insight on how to behave among members of our own and other 
species. Evolution helps us understand the purpose and reasons for our physiology and anatomy 
(Moritz, 2010). 
Since the Darwinian theory of evolution gained widespread acceptance in the late 1800s, 
scientists and philosophers have been looking for ways to relate traditional evolutionary theory to 
the way we live, interact with society, and think about our place in existence. Now the Lamarckian 
evolution within artificial life has become a relatively recent object worthy of philosophical attention 
(Stewart, 2005). Therefore, the new questions of particular interest in evolutionary philosophy are 
how much of an influence Lamarckian evolution in ALife would have on human behavior, and what 
are the philosophical implications of this evolution on issues that relate to ethics and morality. 
 
1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The main goal of this dissertation is to identify the potential impact of implementation of knowledge 
inheritance in artificial organisms using Lamarckian scheme across disciplines. The objectives being 
pursued in order to achieve this goal are the following: 
1. Build two artificial life models of Darwinian and Lamarckian knowledge inheritance processes 
using genetic algorithms and artificial neural networks. Based on this example, prove that such 
implementation is possible in computational environment.  
2. Evaluate possible impact of knowledge inheritance in artificial organisms on life and society, 
considering latest trends across disciplines. 
3. Using the qualitative data obtained from focus group discussion, evaluate and understand the 




2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. EVOLUTION 
Evolution is variation in the heritable traits of biological populations over succeeding generations. 
Evolution is the mechanism producing the diversity of life at every level of biological organization, 
including the levels of species, individual organisms, and molecules (Hall et al., 2007).  
Evolution is the foundation of modern science, believed as one of the most reliably proven by 
all facts and theories of science, based on evidence not just from the biological sciences, but also 
from anthropology, psychology, astrophysics, chemistry, geology, physics, mathematics, and other 
scientific disciplines, as well as behavioral and social sciences. The discovery of evolution has made 
significant contributions to humanity, including the prevention and treatment of human disease, new 
agricultural products, industrial innovations, a subfield of computer science, and rapid advances in 
life science (Ayala, 2008). 
Evolution and philosophy relate to each other as long as the idea of evolution exists. On the 
one hand, this is due to the fact that science and philosophy only separated around the time 
evolutionary theories were being first proposed, on the other hand, because evolution was opposed 
to many cherished philosophical doctrines, particularly in Darwinian context (Wilkins, 1997). 
 
2.2. GENETIC ALGORITHMS 
A genetic algorithm (or GA for short) is a programming technique that imitates biological evolution as 
a problem-solving strategy. Given a specific problem to solve, the input to the GA is a set of 
candidate solutions to that problem, encoded in a certain way, and a metric called a fitness function 
that quantitatively evaluates each possible solution. These candidates can possibly be already known 
working solutions, with the purpose of the GA being to improve them, but more often they are 
randomly generated (Marczyk, 2004). 
Genetic algorithms (GAs) provide a learning method inspired by an analogy to biological 
evolution. Rather than search from general-to-specific hypotheses, or from simple-to-complex, GAs 
generate successor hypotheses by repeatedly mutating and recombining parts of the best currently 
known hypotheses. At each step, a set of hypotheses named the current population is renewed by 
replacing some part of the population by the offspring of the fittest to current hypotheses. The 
process constitutes a generate-and-test beam-search of hypotheses, in which variations of the best 
current hypotheses are most likely to be considered next (Mitchell, 1997). 
In GAs, the term chromosome normally refers to a point in the search space of candidate 
solutions to a problem, often encoded as a bit string. The genes are either single bits or short blocks 
of adjacent bits that encode a certain element of the candidate solution. Each locus in the 
chromosome has two possible alleles: 0 and 1; for larger alphabets other alleles are possible 
(Mitchell, 1996).  
The most generic form of a genetic algorithm involves three types of operators: selection, 
crossover (single point), and mutation. Selection picks chromosomes in the population for 
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reproduction: the fitter the chromosome, the more likely it will be selected. Crossover is typically the 
commutation of genetic material between two single chromosome haploid parents. Mutation flips 
the bit at a randomly chosen locus (or, for larger alphabets, replaces the symbol at a randomly 
chosen locus with a randomly chosen new symbol); it occurs with a very small probability (e.g. 
0.001). 
The GA processes populations of chromosomes, consequentially replacing one such 
population with another. The fitness function assigns a score (fitness) to each chromosome in the 
current population. The fitness of a chromosome depends on how well that chromosome solves the 
given problem. 
The genotype of an individual in a GA using bit strings is simply the configuration of bits in 
that individual's chromosome. Even though there is often no such thing as a phenotype in the 
context of GAs, lately some researchers have experimented with GAs in which there is both a 
genotypic level and a phenotypic level, e.g. the bit−string encoding of a neural network and the 
neural network itself. 
Genetic algorithms are widely applied in different scientific areas like electronics, mechanics 
and computer science. These are just a tiny sample of their possible applications, although those are 
some of the most important, and many other examples can be found in advanced books and articles. 
 
2.3. ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS AND BACKPROPAGATION ALGORITHM 
One of the ways to understand and resolve complex problems is to follow the lemma “divide and 
conquer” and decompose them into simpler elements. Also simple elements may be assembled to 
produce a complex system (Bar Yam, 1997). Networks are one method for achieving this. There is a 
large number of various types of networks, but they all are characterized by the following 
components: a set of nodes, and connections between nodes (Gershenson, 2003). 
Stergiou and Siganos (1996) defined artificial neural network (ANN) as an information 
processing paradigm inspired by the way biological nervous systems (such as the brain) process 
information. It consists of interconnected processing elements working together to solve specific 
problems and learns by example: each ANN is built for a specific application through a “learning 
process”. In fact, ANNs have also inherited another important characteristic of a brain: the ability to 
interpolate from incomplete information (Hewitson and Crane, 1994). 
An artificial neuron is a computational model inspired by biological neurons. The interface 
through which biological neurons interact with their neighbors usually consists of several axon 
terminals connected via synapses to dendrites on other neurons. If the sum of the input signals into 
one neuron exceeds a certain threshold, the neuron sends an action potential (AP) at the axon hillock 
and passes this electrical signal along the axon (Weiss, 2007). This signal might be sent to another 
synapse, and might activate other neurons (Gershenson, 2003). 
The complexity of real neurons is drastically simplified when modeling artificial neurons, 
which consist of inputs (like synapses) multiplied by weights (strength of the respective signals), and 
then are computed by a mathematical function which determines the activation of the neuron. 
 
9 
Another function (which may be the identity) computes the output of the artificial neuron 
(sometimes in dependence of a certain threshold). ANNs connect artificial neurons in order to 
process information. 
A neural network can be characterized by its architecture (which is pattern of connections 
between neurons), by algorithm (or method of determining weights on the connections), and by its 
activation function (Fausett, 1994). 
The arrangement of neurons into layers and the connection patterns within and between 
layers is called the net architecture. Neural nets are often classified as single-layer or multilayer 
(Fausett, 1994). When defining the number of layers, the input units are not counted as a layer, since 
they do not perform any computation. Therefore, the number of layers in the net can be determined 
by the number of weighted interconnected links between the slabs of neurons, as those weights in 
the network contain extremely important information. 
A single-layer neural network has one layer of connection weights (see figure 1). The input 
units receive signals from outside world, while output units represent the response of the net. In this 
typical single-layer neural network, the input units are fully connected to output units, while being 
unconnected to one another; the output units are not connected to each other either. 
 
Figure 1: A single-layer neural net 
The training in this neural net setting is typically accomplished by presenting a sequence of 
training vectors, each with an associated output vector. The weights are being changed according to 
a learning algorithm, which is called supervised training. The single-layer nets use supervised training 
(the Hebb rule or the delta rule). Unsupervised or self-organizing nets group similar input vectors 
together without the use of training data to identify to which group each vector belongs, and are 
often used for clustering problems, as well as for other tasks. There is some ambiguity in the labeling 
of training methods as supervised or unsupervised, and some authors find a third category, called 
self-supervised training, useful. 
The characteristics of the problem to be resolved determines whether a single-layer net is 
adequate. In case the problem is more difficult, a multilayer net, such as that trained by 
backpropagation, may be better. A multilayer neural net (see figure 2) is a net with one or more 
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layers (or levels) of nodes (the so-called hidden units) between the input units and output units. 
Normally, there is a layer of weights between two neighbor levels of units (input, hidden, or output). 
Although training multilayer neural nets may be more difficult, they can resolve problems that single-
layer nets cannot be trained to perform correctly at all. 
 
 
Figure 2: A multilayer neural net 
The single-layer and multilayer networks illustrated in figures 1 and 2 are examples of 
feedforward nets, where the signals flow from the input units to the output units, in a forward 
direction. The fully interconnected competitive net in the figure 3 is an example of a recurrent net. In 
this network, there are closed-loop signal paths from a unit back to itself.  
 
Figure 3: A competitive neural net 
The backpropagation algorithm (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986) or the generalized delta 
rule (Fausett, 1994) is applied in layered feed-forward ANNs, where artificial neurons are ordered in 
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layers and send their signals “forward”, and then the errors are propagated backwards. It is simply a 
gradient descent method of minimizing the total squared error of the output computed by the net. 
The network receives inputs by neurons in the input layer, and the output of the network is given by 
the neurons on an output layer. There may be one or more intermediate hidden layers.  
The backpropagation algorithm uses supervised learning, which means that we initially 
supply the algorithm with examples of the inputs and outputs we want the network to compute, and 
then calculate the error (difference between actual and expected results). The goal of the 
backpropagation algorithm is to reduce this error, until the ANN learns the training data 
(Gershenson, 2003). The training begins with random weights, and the objective is to adjust them so 
that the error will be minimal. 
The training of the network by backpropagation involves three stages: the feedforward of the 
input training pattern (i), the calculation and backpropagation of the associated error (ii), and the 
adjustment of the weights (iii). While a single-layer net is very limited in the mappings it can learn, a 
multilayer net can learn any continuous mapping to an arbitrary accuracy. Usually one hidden layer is 
sufficient, even though more layers may be beneficial for some applications (Fausett, 1994). 
An activation function for a backpropagation net should have several important 
characteristics: continuity, differentiability (a derivative should exist at each point in its domain), it 
should be monotonically non-decreasing and easy to compute. One of the most typical activation 
functions is the binary sigmoid function, which has range of (0, 1) and is defined as: 
 
Figure 4: A binary sigmoid function 
The choice of initial weights and biases will influence whether the net reaches a global (or 
only a local) minimum of the error and, if so, how quickly it converges. The update of the weight 
between two units depends on both derivative of the upper unit’s activation function and the 
activation of the lower unit. Therefore, it is crucial to avoid choices of initial weights that would make 
it likely that either activations or derivatives of activations are zero. 
A typical procedure is to initialize the weights (and biases) to random values between -0.5 
and 0.5 (or between -1 and 1 or some other required interval). The values can be positive or 
negative, since the final weights after training can be of either sign as well. It is important to 
remember that the values for the initial weights should not be very large, otherwise the initial input 
signals to each hidden or output unit will be likely to fall in the region where the derivative of the 
sigmoid function has a very small value (the so-called saturation region). At the same time, if the 
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initial weights are too small, the net input to a hidden or output unit will be almost zero, which also 
causes extremely slow learning. 
A simple modification of random initialization, developed by Nguyen and Widrow (1990) 
typically gives much faster learning. Their approach is based on a geometrical analysis of the 
response of the hidden neurons to a single input. The Nguyen-Widrow method generates initial 
weights and bias values for a layer, so that the active regions of the layer’s neurons will be 
distributed approximately evenly over the input space (Demuth, 2002). 
A Darwin-neural network is a neural network based on structural patterns and learning 
processes introduced by the neural Darwinism theory (Edelman, 1987). A Darwin-neural network 
learns specific tasks through interactions with an unknown environment, and its behavior develops 
according to gained the experience (Manderick, 1991). However, a Lamarckian-neural network is a 
non-orthodox problem solving tool that combines evolution and learning techniques (Cortez et al., 
2002).  
 
2.4. ARTIFICIAL LIFE AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL MEANING 
The contemporary idea of artificial life as a discipline was proposed by Christopher Langton (1989) in 
his book “Artificial Life. An Overview”, who described the field broadly as devoted to studying the 
scientific, technological, artistic, philosophical, and social implications of creating “living” artifacts. 
According to Langton, it emulates traditional biology by trying to recreate some features of biological 
phenomena; at the same time, the modeling philosophy of artificial life strongly differs from 
traditional modeling by studying not only “life-as-we-know-it” but also “life-as-it-might-be”. In 
addition, as Bruce Sterling later wrote for “The Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction” in 1992, the 
relatively new field of study named artificial life was created as an attempt to abstract the logical 
form of life from its material manifestation. 
The concept of artificial life may be used with different meanings. At the beginning, the term 
“artificial life” was originally defined it as “life made by man rather than by nature,” i.e., it is the 
study of man-made systems that exhibit behaviors characteristic of natural living systems (Langton, 
1989). Later, however, Langton discovered fundamental problems with this definition, and changed it 
to “the study of natural life, where nature is understood to include rather than to exclude, human 
beings and their artifacts” (Langton, 1998). He insisted that human beings and all their actions are 
inseparable part of nature, therefore a major goal of ALife should be to work towards eliminating 
“artificial life” as a phrase that differs in meaning in any significant way from the term “biology”. In 
fact, it is quite common nowadays in a biological research to use computational models, which would 
have been considered ALife 20 years ago, but now they are part of mainstream biology (Bourne et 
al., 2005). 
Since its outbreak in the late 1980s, the study of artificial life has bonded together scientists 
interested in a formal and general comprehension of living systems (Husbands et al., 1997).  
Researchers and philosophers are actively conducting their studies in the areas like the definition of 
life, the relationship between the life and mind, and the possibility of creating life within 
computational environment (Keeley, 1998).  
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Many of the subjects of artificial life and artificial intelligence overlap, so these fields can be 
considered closely related. According to Bedau (2003), living and evolving in a dynamic and 
unpredictable environment requires at least rudimentary intelligence. Nevertheless, artificial life is 
especially focused on systems, which can mimic nature and its laws and therefore it is more related 
to biology, while the latter is mainly focused on how human intelligence can be replicated, and 
therefore, it is more related to psychology. In addition, different modeling strategies are used in 
these two fields. Most conventional AI models are top-down specific systems involving a 
complicated, centralized controller that makes decisions based on access to all aspects of global 
state. However, ALife systems are usually bottom-up (Maes, 1993), implemented as low-level agents 
that simultaneously interact with each other, and whose decisions are based on information about, 
and directly affect, only their own local environment (Bedau, 2003). 
The inception of artificial life has its deep philosophical meaning. It makes humans rethink 
their conventional anthropocentric views and triggers multiple questions about nature and meaning 
of life. It aims at understanding the fundamental behavior of life-like systems by synthesizing that 
behavior in artificial systems.   
Philosophy and artificial life are true intellectual partners for many reasons. According to 
Sellars (1963), the purpose of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the 
broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term. Bedau 
concluded in 2002, that it applies to artificial life as well: both seek to acquire understanding of 
phenomena at a level of generality that is sufficient to ignore contingencies and uncover essential 
natures. 
Even though philosophy cannot claim with certainty what is the real answer to the doubts it 
raises, it is able to offer many opportunities that expand our thoughts; therefore, while reducing the 
feeling of certainty as to what things are, it significantly improves the knowledge as to what they may 
be (Russell, 1959). Artificial life simulations attempt to answer similar “What if X?” questions (Bedau, 
2002), but the premises they represent are complicated enough to be researched only by computer 
simulation. 
Artificial life is an interdisciplinary field, not just a scientific and engineering enterprise, as 
Bedau noted in “The scientific and philosophical scope of artificial life” (to appear in “Leonardo”) in 
2002. He added that since artificial life offers a new prospect on the primary nature of many basic 
aspects of reality like life, adaptation, and creation, it has rich implications for a handful of broad 
philosophical topics: emergence, evolution, life, and mind. 
At present, the commonly accepted understanding of life does not acknowledge any current 
ALife simulations or software to be alive, as well as they do not form part of the evolutionary process 
of any ecosystem. However, different views on artificial life's potential have arisen (cf. Strong AI vs. 
Weak AI).  
Weak ALife position does not accept the possibility of generating a "living process" outside of 
a biological solution. The researchers in weak Alife try to simulate life processes to understand the 
underlying mechanisms of biological phenomena.  
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Strong ALife amounts to the claim that, by programming a computer, one can literally bring 
bits of its hardware to life (Olson, 1997). John von Neumann described strong ALife position through 
his Theory of Reproducing Automata (1963), which states that life is a process which can be 
abstracted away from any particular medium. Several decades later, Ray T. declared that his program 
Tierra is not simulating life in a computational environment, but generating it, as it was noted in C. 
Taylor’s “To follow a rule” in 1992. 
In this research, the role of ALife system modeling is to serve to prime intuitions and 
generate hypotheses regarding living systems, which may later be tested by more traditional means. 
On this view, we are talking about weak ALife, and the modeling and simulation of evolution may 
best be thought of as a theory building paradigm (Diallo et al., 2013). 
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3. METHODOLOGY (DESIGN SCIENCE) 
3.1. DESIGN SCIENCE 
Most of the research in the Information Systems discipline can be characterized by two paradigms: 
behavioral science and design science (Hevner et al., 2004). Considering the nature and the objectives 
of this dissertation, design science was chosen as a suitable methodology: it is outcome-based, and 
has explicit intention of improving the functional performance of the model (Vaishnavi et al., 2007). 
The design-science paradigm originates from engineering and the sciences of the artificial 
(Simon, 1996). It helps to understand the behavior of information systems by creating new and 
innovative artifacts (Hevner et al., 2004). Such artifacts, depending on the research, are widely 
defined by constructs, models, methods and instantiations. In design science, as opposed to 
explanatory science, academic research can be seen as a quest for understanding and improving 
human performance (Van Aken, 2005), which constitutes one of the possible applications of artificial 
life as a discipline and this research in particular.  
Hevner et al. (2004) have introduced a set of guidelines for design science research within 
the discipline of Information Systems. In this dissertation (following the guidelines), an abstract 
evolutionary model will be considered an artifact. The artifact will be validated by a focus group. 
 
3.2. FOCUS GROUP 
A focus group is a form of qualitative research where a group of people are asked about their 
perceptions, opinions, beliefs and attitudes towards a certain product, service, concept, 
advertisement, idea, or packaging. A moderator asks questions in an interactive group setting where 
participants can talk and engage in a discussion with other group members. During this process, the 
researcher either takes notes or makes a record of the crucial points he or she is getting from the 
group. Care should be taken while selecting members of the group to obtain effective and 
authoritative responses (Morgan, 1997). 
 Group discussion produces data and insights that would be hardly accessible without 
interaction found in a group setting—hearing others’ outspoken experiences triggers associations, 
ideas and memories in participants. This is also known as the group effect where group members 
engage in some sort of ‘chaining’ or ‘cascading’ effect – new ideas emerge from the topics and 
expressions preceding them (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). 
 The analysis of focus group data presents both challenges and opportunities when compared 
to other types of qualitative data. While focus groups data can be analyzed in the same manner as 
interview data (Harding, 2013), there are also unique features of focus groups to be taken into 
consideration – particularly the opportunity that it provides to observe interactions between group 
members. Data analysis can take place at the level of the individual or the group. 
 A fundamental limitation in focus groups (and other forms of qualitative research) is the 
problem of observer dependency: the results obtained are influenced by the researcher or his or her 
own reading of the group's discussion, raising questions of validity, called experimenter’s bias 
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(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992). On the other hand, focus groups can create major issues of 
external validity (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Other common (and related) criticism involve 
groupthink, where members try to minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision (Irving, 1972), 
and social desirability bias, where members respond in a manner that would be viewed favorably by 
others (Fisher, 1993). 
 
3.3. RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Design science methodology is formed as a chain of six activities that allows researchers to start from 
any of them and reinitiate the process (Peffers et al., 2007). These activities and their application in 
this research are described in the table below. 




The problem of this research is the definition of the impact of Lamarckian 
evolution in ALife on various scientific disciplines, our life and society. Special 
attention has been given to the future role of Lamarckian knowledge inheritance 
in computer science, biology and philosophy 
Definition of 
the objectives 
The objectives here are qualitative and aim to identify possible implications of 
knowledge inheritance across disciplines through Lamarckian evolutionary scheme 
in artificial organisms 
Design and 
development 
The model has been designed using theoretical knowledge about neural networks 
and genetic algorithms. The model has led to a set of questions, which have been 
organized and presented to a focus group 
Demonstration The model has been shown to the invited members of the focus group. We have 
discussed whether this model can be used to simulate Lamarckian evolution in a 
computational environment and what philosophical significance this model can 
have, given the possibility of artificial life creation (at this stage, we assumed that 
the implementation of this model is doable, or at least does not suffer enough 
roadblocks to preclude attempting it, in order to examine the ethics of pursuing 
the project) 
Evaluation Using a focus group of researchers from computer science, biology and 
philosophy, we have validated the model and defined its implications in each 
mentioned discipline, given the possibility of its implementation in ALife in the 
near future 
Communication Late-breaking abstract of this research has been submitted and accepted on the 
scientific conference ALIFE XV. Accepted late-breaking abstracts have been 
compiled into a Late-Breaking Abstract Proceedings PDF and made publicly 







In 2010, two American biologists Craig Venter and Hamilton Smith have made a bacterium that has 
an artificial genome—creating a living creature with no ancestor (Gibson et al., 2010). According to 
Craig Venter himself, this cell has not yet found any practical applications, but it enables a change in 
philosophy, it is a proof of concept. But the proof of concept that we can potentially create and 
modify living creatures the way we want was key, otherwise it is just speculation and science fiction. 
At the same time, there have been several successful attempts to model Lamarckian 
evolution in computer science and engineering (Morris et al., 1998; Sasaki and Tokoro, 2000), e.g. in 
automated docking (Morris et al., 1998).  This model of evolution has been used for boosting search 
in particular kind of applications, however, the cost associated with the evaluation of the objective 
function with the use of Lamarckian evolution was an issue to consider. Such models have a broad 
range of applications over several different domains, e.g. optimization in engineering. 
If the two mentioned approaches were combined, and there were indeed purely artificial 
organisms that would learn through interactions with the environment, numerous ethical and 
philosophical implications would arise. While some may regard the creation of purely artificial 
organisms as a defining moment in the history of biology, others may claim that the risks could 
outweigh the benefits.  
The inception on species capable of Lamarckian learning does have the potential to do great 
harm, as well as good. From the philosophical point of view, this research may be seen as playing 
God and even distorting the essence of life, instead of allowing life to emerge through natural 
processes and perhaps by nature's will. From a more practical point of view, some irreversible 
horrors may come creeping out of the flask on the laboratory bench, once a new Lamarckian 
specimen is introduced to the natural environment. These issues should give pause even to those 
who normally embrace advances in science with enthusiasm.  
 
4.2. PROPOSAL (MODEL) 
Instead of presenting an automaton with single-layer neural networks like in AntFarm (Collins and 
Jefferson, 1992), we will train a multilayer neural network using backpropagation (of errors) or the 
generalized delta rule, since a multilayer net can lean any continuous mapping to an arbitrary 
accuracy (Fausett, 1994). Training a network will include the feedforward of the input training 
pattern, the backpropagation of the associated error, and the adjustment of the weights. 
 It is important to note that we used a multilayer neural network with descendant weight 
updates, as well as backpropagation and delta rule, just to provide an example in an abstract model. 
There could have been other examples, where other types of neural networks would be used. 
Consider the following network (fig. 5), in which we can formulate both feedforward 
propagation and backpropagation as a series of matrix multiplies. From now on, we are going to 
index matrices as A(i), where A refers to the type of matrix and (i) is an index of the position of the 
 
18 
matrix in the network (we can also have (i→j) for a weight matrix connected layer i to layer j). The 
only exceptions are the input data matrix X and the output of the network Y. We denote the value of 
an element in row i and column j of some matrix A(k) with Aij
(k) (Dolhansky, 2014). 
 
Figure 5: Simplified model of the neural network of an automaton 
The defined automata can be made of several areas, part of them would corresponding to a 
neural net (Domeniconi, 1996) and making up a neurological system: vision, hearing, touch, and 
internal sensing; the rest are physical characteristics. In AntFarm (Collins and Jefferson, 1992), agents 
of the same colony have identical genetic codes. This is not what we are looking for. The automata in 
this model have some, although minor differences in their connections between neurons, which 
better represents such in real biological systems. 
The neurological system of automata consists of organs (vision, hearing, touch, internal 
sensing), through which it receives inputs (like synapses) in the neurons nm about the environment. 
Based on the weights wp,q, which stand for knowledge, a mathematical function would determine the 
activation of the neuron. Another function (which may be identical) computes the output of the 
artificial neuron and lead to an action of automata, like movement, eating, reproducing, or 
breathing. 
Changing weights in the model represents learning. Automaton will learn throughout its life, 
which means all its weights wi,j will change in order to let it make better decisions (as a result of its 
learning experience). Cwi,j is a learning matrix with weights that change with time. The 
backpropagation algorithm will be used to compute the necessary corrections. The algorithm can be 
decomposed in the following four steps (Rojas, 1996): feed-forward computation, backpropagation 
to the output layer, backpropagation to the hidden layer, and weight updates. 
During feedforward, each input unit Xi receives an input signal and broadcasts this signal to 
the each of the hidden units Z1. . . ., Zp. Each hidden unit then computes its activation and sends its 
signal zj to output units. Output units Yk compute their activation yk to form the response of the net 
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for the given input pattern (Fausett, 1994). Note that the network will not be fully connected, just 
like our human brain.  
The first step to take will be preparing a population. At the beginning, the weights and 
thresholds for each individual will be randomized using Nguyen-Widrow algorithm (1990): 
1. Define scale factor (β), where n = number of input units, p = number of hidden units: 
 
2. For each hidden unit (j = 1, . . . . , p): 
2.1. Initialize its weight vector by randomizing each weight between -0.5 and 0.5; 
2.2. Calculate vector length for weights  
 
2.3. Update new weights: 
 
2.4. Calculate threshold values (set biases): 
 
 
The environment is represented as a bi-dimensional plane 500 x 1000, part of the plane is 
represented on fig. 5 (only part for better visibility), where the automata can move right, left, up and 




Figure 6: Artificial life environment of automata (piece) 
Let us provide some exemplary values for better representation. These values can be 
changed as variables in the parameters section of the simulation software. At the start, we have five 
predators, four automata and nine food units. The life duration of the automata is 100 time units (t), 
of a predator – 60t, and food regrows on the same spot in 50t. Automata are born with 50 energy 
units (E), predators – with 70E, and they spend energy on various actions in a struggle for survival. 
When the level of energy of A or Z drops to 0, they die. 
Every time automata eat food O, their energy increases by 50E, each move decreases it by 
10E, reproduction decreases it by 50E, and when A meets a predator Z, A dies. Predators have 70 
energy units at birth and they do not consume Os, but if they eat A, their energy increases by 100E. 
Food cannot move, predators and automata can move right, left, up and down. The 
automaton has to learn to come closer to the Os to get energy from them, while moving away from 
Zs that represent danger. Each time one automaton meets another, they reproduce, and two new 
automata appear. When Z meets another Z, they reproduce the third Z and lose 30E. 
The example of such learning matrix of A1 that is responsible for vision at the initial time t=0 
is the following:  
Vwi,j (t=0)= {x; y; z; v; u; …} 
As time goes by, A1 learns to choose better strategies, and weights change accordingly. This is 
the example of how a matrix might look like at t=10 when some weights have changed: 
Vwi,j (t=10)= {x; p; q; v; u; …} 
At some point, e.g. t=50, A1 and A2 meet, and in our environment, they have to reproduce 
and make two new automata. The learning matrix now looks like this: 
Vwi,j (t=50)= {p; q; a; b; u; …} 
Now it is time to see what kind of traits the new life would inherit, according to Darwinian 
and Lamarckian approaches. In the figure 3, there is an example of what neural networks of parent 
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A1 could be. The inputs from the environment reach input neurons on the left, get to a hidden layer, 
and based on knowledge hidden in weights, output neurons trigger actions on the right. 
 
 
Figure 7: Neural network of parent A1 
The neural network of the second parent would be very similar to such of the first parent. 
We assume that the amount of the neurons is roughly the same, the difference is in the location of 
the connections between them, and it should not be very big.  
 
Figure 8: Darwinian crossover (piece) 
According to Darwinist approach, automaton is born with heuristic values that are inherited 
through a crossover, however, it has almost no knowledge at all (see figure 5). The weights of its 
neural network are chosen pseudo-randomly. This means that instead of a crossover, the initial 
weights would be replaced by some heuristic (inborn) values appropriate just for automaton’s 
survival, e.g. breathing or eating. In the figures 8 and 9, there will be only pieces of the whole 




In a Lamarckian neural network, however, weights will be inherited as well. They can be 
transferred to children directly (as in figure 9) or through any mathematical function, e.g. average of 
corresponding weights.  
 
Figure 9: Lamarckian crossover (piece) 
This is just an example to prove an evolutionary neural network combined with Lamarckian 
approach is possible to create. This model is not attempting to explain how a brain of a pure 
Lamarckian being would work. It aims to demonstrate a possibility of creating a robot, whose 
learning would have a Lamarckian component, since at least some of its knowledge would be passed 
to the offspring. 
 
4.3. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
In our culture, there is a widespread image of a superior artificial mind conquering the planet. In 
reality, Darwinian or Lamarckian, an artificial species will more likely become another species’ lunch. 
The risks about creating artificial life are exaggerated.  
When the news about Craig Venter’s achievement came out, people started to become 
worried about the dangers that ALife could bring. Such worries are of the same nature as popular 
beliefs that natural is good and artificial is bad. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth – 
malaria is very natural yet disastrous, while antibiotics are man-made, but very handy sometimes. 
However, Lamarckian artificial life can be risky if released into natural environment, given the 
examples of already existing failed interventions in natural design, mostly because the dimensions of 
its danger are never known in advance. Therefore, even if the implementation of synthetic 
Lamarckian evolution is allowed, it should be regulated and licensed in order to avoid malevolent 
use. 
For human beings, however, the possibility of inheriting knowledge would have its major 
drawbacks. Often our parents are not the people we want to inherit knowledge from, especially in a 
form of a random combination of their skills instead of a catalog. Moreover, it is nice to inherit 
knowledge from a person like Einstein, but all the pains, fears and mental issues of our parents would 
be inherited too, which would have a major negative impact on our lives. In addition, our brains do 
not work like hard drives that store information the way it is over the years. Our memories get 
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distorted over time, we forget some details and come up with new ones. Passing such flawed 
knowledge through generations does not seem like a good idea. 
While Lamarckian evolution has wide application in ALife and can be surely used in experiments 
in artificial environment, for human beings, Darwinian evolution seems to make more sense. At the 
end of the day, we are all living in dynamic environments where inheriting knowledge is often useless 
– we keep re-learning again and again, and the ability to unlearn old skills and study everything anew 
seems to be the new literacy. 
All these hypotheses and assumptions have led to many questions that we organized and 
presented to our focus group. The discussion will provide better understandings whether these 
concerns are valid. 
 
4.4. VALIDATION 
Our focus group discussion constituted gathering together experts from different backgrounds and 
experiences to discuss the topic of interest, which is the introduction of Lamarckian species to the 
world. The group of participants has been guided by a moderator who introduced questions for 
discussion and helped the group to participate in a lively and natural discussion amongst themselves. 
The validity of the discussion relies on allowing the participants to agree or disagree with 
each other so that it provides an insight into how a group thinks about an issue, about the range of 
opinion and ideas, and the inconsistencies and variation that exists in a particular community in 
terms of beliefs and their experiences and practices (Viji and Benedict, 2014). 
Compared to surveys, focus groups can reveal a wealth of more detailed information and 
deeper insight. If executed right, a focus group creates a comfortable environment that puts 
participants at ease, inviting them to consciously answer questions in their own words and add 
personal meaning to their answers. 
 The size of the group has been chosen in a way that the group is big enough to generate rich 
discussion, but not so big that some participants are left out. We invited two philosophers, two 
researchers from computer science, and one biologist. The participants have been chosen from 
different backgrounds to give a better perspective in an open discussion, rather than just a simple 
record of their personal attitudes to the question. The goal was to generate a maximum number of 








The questions have been grouped by discipline and presented to the focus group in the 
following format: 
Discipline Questions 
Biology 1. Would the introduction of Lamarckian organisms become a determining 
moment in the history of biology?  
2. Can this research be abused to create a biological weapon? 
3. Would the benefits of Lamarckian evolution be significant in synthetic biology? 
4. If inheriting knowledge was possible in the same way as we inherit eye or hair 
color, does it mean that we would inherit fears and psychological disorders from 
our parents too?  
5. Do you think we would be better fit to our environment if we could inherit 
knowledge from parents? 
6. How do you see the impact on evolution if Lamarckian knowledge inheritance 
was real? What would happen to the rate of such evolution, would it speed up or 
slow down? Why? 
7. What potential risks can be contained? 
Computer 
science 
1. What kind of systems can be developed using such evolution? When, now, in 10 
years? 
2. Will this evolution have any practical application in engineering in the nearest 
future? Why? 
3. Do you agree that adding weights to the model is the correct way to model 
Lamarckian inheritance? Is anything missing? 
Philosophy 1. If we are building artificial life models, are we playing the role of gods? 
2. If we are able to create a different life using such type of models, do we have a 
chance to be better gods? 
3. Is creating artificial life consistent with nature/God? 
4. Does this evolution contradict the idea of free will/freedom of choice? 
5. Do we have a chance to be happier if we could know what our parents know? 
6. Is Lamarckian evolution more ethical than Darwinian? Why? 
7. Will this type of research help us understand the relationship between us and 






Focus groups are conducted based on a set of structured and predefined questions, but the 
discussion is free-flowing. Ideally, participant comments will stimulate and influence the thinking and 
sharing of others. Some people might even change their thoughts and opinions during the group 
discussion. 
In order to make use of all participant comments, it is essential to boil them down to 
essential information using a systematic and verifiable process. In our case, we have started by 
transcribing all focus group tapes and inserting notes into transcribed material where appropriate. 
Then the transcripts have been cleaned up by stripping off nonessential words (Eliot & Associates, 
2005). 
 The answers presented below summarize all responses and disagreements that have been 
recorded during the focus group discussion. We noted that the researchers from philosophy 
sometimes disagreed with each other, hence their opinions are represented below as A and B. In 
fact, we found their opinions complementary rather than contradictory. 
  
5.1. BIOLOGICAL IMPACT 
1. Would the introduction of Lamarckian organisms become a determining moment in the history 
of biology?  
Humans engineered organisms for centuries; synthetic life is just one step further, which makes it, 
obviously, a great achievement, yet this can be hardly considered a determining moment. We 
already have powerful means to engineer organisms, and at this moment of time, synthetic life does 
not add that much. Moreover, Craig Venter and his team did not actually engineer synthetic life, the 
resulting cell only has synthetic DNA that requires a living host cell. 
 
2. Can this research be abused to create a biological weapon? 
At this very moment, nobody knows for sure where it will all lead. Like in any type of research, some 
of it can be abused by malevolent scientists, but that has been true of just about every human 
advance and should not stop us. Any scientific advance can be abused; Lamarckian evolution in 
synthetic life no different. 
 
3. Would the benefits of Lamarckian evolution be significant in synthetic biology? 
The benefits are rather unclear, but they look promising. The approach of designing synthetic cells 
will allow us to begin with a DNA sequence and engineer organisms precisely up to our specific 
needs, including building Lamarckian species. At the moment, we can think of better drugs, greener 
fuels and dramatic changes in chemical industry, and Lamarckian learning can potentially benefit the 
research in this direction.  
 
4. If inheriting knowledge was possible in the same way as we inherit eye or hair color, does it 
mean that we would inherit fears and psychological disorders from our parents too?  
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Yes, but in the same way that we inherit any other disease or trait. For example, we inherited fear of 
snakes from our ancestors, which is positive, since snakes can be deadly for us. This does not seem to 
be a particularly dangerous thing. 
 
5. Do you think we would be better fit to our environment if we could inherit knowledge from 
parents? 
Not really. In fact, it is questionable whether artificial Lamarckian organisms can survive in natural 
environment at all. There is no evidence that knowledge inheritance to such degree can enable 
Lamarckian species to prosper in a constantly changing environment like real world.   
 
6. How do you see the impact on evolution if Lamarckian knowledge inheritance was real? What 
would happen to the rate of such evolution, would it speed up or slow down? Why? 
It depends on what knowledge is being inherited. The knowledge that is necessary for the survival of 
the species is being already inherited – as it was already mentioned, organisms are not born blank. It 
is unclear how all extra knowledge would benefit the species. At least human brain, despite a 
common belief, is nothing like a hard drive of the computer – one piece of knowledge does not 
occupy the space where some other knowledge could be stored, yet there is no evidence that 
learning from scratch would be slower or faster than relearning. 
 
7. What potential risks can be contained? 
On the one hand, synthetic organisms carry no greater risks than natural ones, even though new 
species that evolve via Darwinian evolution do not receive nearly as much recognition or cause fear 
as hybridization by genetic engineering. On the other hand, there are some terrifying examples of 
other types of artificial constructions, like GEO crops and over-use of pesticides that led to 
environmental problems.  In addition, the research in synthetic life is expensive and may be driven by 
profits more than benefits to humanity. 
 
5.2. TECHNICAL IMPACT 
1. What kind of systems can be developed using such evolution? When, now, in 10 years? 
Lamarckian evolutionary algorithms have been used for quite some years, and quite successfully. 
However, their application in strong ALife or artificially engineered organisms we would consider 
alive, can only be approximated only based on the existing roadmaps of futurists. These assumptions 
would have little precision, and the feasibility of this implementation will depend on the accessibility 
of brain‐emulating hardware, which is a hard thing to do at sufficiently low cost.  
 
2. Will this evolution have any practical application in engineering in the nearest future? Why? 
As mentioned before, it already does, and its potential is quite huge. Since 80s, it has been used for 
function optimization; this evolutionary algorithm has proven to be robust and fit for various 
optimization problems and machine learning techniques.  
 
3. Do you agree that adding weights to the model is the correct way to model Lamarckian 
inheritance? Is anything missing? 
We believe this is one of the simplistic ways of representing Lamarckian evolution, and alternative 
models are possible also. At the same time, for now this research is only related to computer science, 
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hence, it is rather a cybernetic adventure, not a way to understand the relationship between us and 
the creator any better. 
 
5.3. PHILOSOPHICAL IMPACT 
1. If we are building artificial life models, are we playing the role of gods? 
A: If we are building ALife models, we cannot say that we are playing the role of gods. Can we define 
God? We do not know what God is. If we do not know, how can we compare?  
B: Maybe we are playing the role of gods when we are creating such artificial life models, but only if 
we understand God as a metaphor. We imitate gods in the same creationist sense as artists do when 
they write a musical or literary composition.  
2. If we are able to create a different life using such type of models, do we have a chance to be 
better gods? 
A: Who knows? Without the proper definition of God, it is impossible to answer this question.  
B: If we are to take already existing definitions of God, we would not necessarily be better gods, at 
least according to Christianity, because the God in a Christian sense is already a perfection – kind and 
good, while we, humans, are not perfect. If we define God as Stephen Hawking does, which means it 
has the knowledge of the past, present and future, it would be difficult to compete with that. In 
terms of better capacity, however, artificial life has certainly better potential than human race, 
because it can be faster and more efficient by a range of indicators. 
 
3. Is creating artificial life consistent with nature/God? 
B: Absolutely. Humanity has been playing the role of God in creationist sense throughout the history, 
and there is no reason to limit nature's creativity to exclude acts of man. Since humans are creatures 
of God, their actions are part of God's or nature’s design. If nature has given humans brains strong 
enough that they will invent species that supersede or eliminate them one day, this can be seen as 
part of evolution, or God’s plan, whatever you may call it. 
 
4. Does this evolution contradict the idea of free will/freedom of choice? 
B: If we inherit knowledge from parents, the concept of free will may disappear. By definition, free 
will is the capacity for an agent to make choices in which the outcome has not been determined by 
past events. The model of knowledge inheritance contradicts the fundamental idea of free will. In 
addition, we would not have to learn many things, since the answer would already be in our heads, 
therefore, it seems like there would be less trial and error.  
A: On the other hand, this evolution does not necessarily contradict free will or freedom of choice in 
the practical sense. What matters is not if you have more knowledge, but what you do with this 
knowledge. In addition, according to Plato, we do not learn anything, we simply recall, so is there any 
free will at all?  
5. Do we have a chance to be happier if we could know what our parents know? 
B: Such evolution also does not guarantee that we would be happier if we could inherit knowledge. 
The joy of knowledge discovery would be taken away.  
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A: Imagine you are 5 years old and you have the knowledge of a 25-year-old person, how will you 
react when you realize the limitations of your body and disproportional development? A 
disembodied mind will quickly get depressed! If everything develops proportionally, evolution will be 
faster and nothing more. We need time to process all the knowledge as well. Happiness will not be 
impacted. Also, even though Western philosophy tends to imply that possessing more knowledge will 
lead us to happier lives, in practice, it does not always work this way. Besides knowledge, happiness 
includes factor of pleasure, and sometimes that means that ignorance is bliss. Moreover, by 
definition, knowledge lies in a context. If you inherit knowledge, not just data/information, you will 
have a double personality inside yourself. Do you want it?  
6. Is Lamarckian evolution more ethical than Darwinian? Why? 
B: If ethics implies maximization of well-being of all conscious organisms, and Lamarckian evolution 
can achieve that by inheriting knowledge, this may be true, but does not seem obvious. From the 
first sight, Lamarckian evolution looks very convenient. In fact, our cultural evolution is already 
Lamarckian, as we can culturally pass what we learned to our offspring. If we take a look at our 
society several centuries ago, we can notice how much we have evolved due to knowledge 
transferred from one generation to another, so it seems like rather an ethical thing. 
7. Will this type of research help us understand the relationship between us and the creator any 
better, or this is just a cybernetic adventure? 
B: Artificial life is limited to a rational sense of the human being, does not have the spiritual 
dimension of the unknown, and cannot embrace the concept of a God, while humans even with 
underdeveloped reasoning skills (like children) can open themselves to irrational things like religion. 
No matter how our rational capabilities increase, they will not let us achieve gods or universe. The 
access to God is only possible through mysticism, which is a different dimension of a human being 
that is not possible to create in AI.  
 
5.4. ANALYZING FOCUS GROUP DATA 
The main objective of our focus group data analysis is to fairly represent the data and communicate 
what the data reveal given the purpose of the study. However, focus group analysis is different from 
quantitative analysis in numerous ways, and even compared to other qualitative analysis strategies, 
focus groups have their own peculiarities. While interviews and speeches are usually logically 
structured, during a focus group discussion, the moderator will likely hear spontaneous and 
inconsistent comments, people changing their minds, wandering conversations and emotionally 
intense answers that may influence other participants’ behavior. 
 While evaluating biological and technical impact comes down to finding relevant references 
with the help of the researchers’ experience in the field, philosophical argumentation is a 
fundamentally different task, based on different kind of methods.  
 When a researcher from philosophy answers the question about a possibility of a human to 
be a better God, it is important to remember that deity is a concept conceived in diverse ways in 
various cultures, typically as a natural or supernatural being considered divine or sacred (O’Brien, 
2009). Nevertheless, the views on the definition of God differ tremendously depending on a person 
being interviewed, thus the response may lack objectivity. 
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 The whole idea of a consistency with nature or God’s will is also just an idea. We cannot say 
for sure if there is a creator and what was his or her idea or intention. In addition, the assumption 
about God as the creator of everything generates an age-old problem: it is not coherent to argue that 
the universe was created by God, but God was in turn created by God to the second power, who was 
in turn created by God to the third power, and so on. 
 The sciences have grown steadily bolder in their claim that all human behavior can be 
explained through the clockwork laws of cause and effect. This shift in perception is the extension of 
an intellectual revolution that began about the time when Charles Darwin first published “On the 
Origin of Species”. Soon after Darwin offered his theory of evolution, his cousin Sir Francis Galton 
began to draw out the implications: if species have evolved, then mental abilities like intelligence 
must be hereditary. But we use these abilities—which some people possess to a greater degree than 
others—in decision-making. So our ability to choose our destiny is not free, but depends on our 
biological inheritance (Cave, 2016), which only reinforces the idea of determinism and shatters the 
concept of free will. If the concept of free will disappears along with scientific advancements, we 
seem to have little reason to worry about the influence of implementation of Lamarckian learning on 
this concept. 
 The aspect of happiness in Lamarckian knowledge inheritance is also questionable. One of 
the focus group participants stated that the joy of discovering knowledge will be taken away, which 
does not seem to be true, as there is plenty more knowledge to discover apart from what our 
parents may know. Moreover, happiness is not equal to joy and may have other components such as 
meaningfulness or having a purpose, and knowledge inheritance, thus probably better awareness, 
might actually help in that matter.  
 At the end, the statement that artificial life cannot have spiritual experiences and is limited 
to a rational sense is also just an opinion. The supporters of strong AI may strongly disagree with this. 
On the other hand, we are not even sure whether spiritual experiences are possible in humans – 
those might be just hallucinations caused by external or internal influences, and a bug in the system 




6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
6.1. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 
This research constitutes a position paper that presents an opinion about future application of 
Lamarckian learning in various disciplines based on existing research in the field and expert opinions 
shared in a focus group discussion. This research aims to demonstrate a specific point of view on a 
future matter that was formed during this discussion, and the purpose of this dissertation is to 
defend, explain and document the reasoning behind that position. The analysis of the discussion has 
led us to several conclusions that are represented below.  
It seems that Lamarckian organisms can have wide practical application across several 
different domains, therefore this type of research should rather be allowed and encouraged. But 
even though Lamarckian evolutionary algorithm already holds major benefits for humanity and 
promises even more, this implementation needs regulation. For now, potential benefits seem to 
outweigh risks, however, the risks are unknown and the required investment might be an issue. 
Firstly, it is absolutely necessary to prevent malevolent use of the research. It can be abused 
in numerous ways, e.g. applied in the creation of biological weapon and bioterrorism. Secondly, since 
the project will require a lot of investment, the research may become driven by profits for harmful 
purposes rather than benefits to humanity as a whole. Thirdly, safety measures should be taken 
before releasing the Lamarckian species into natural environment. This will be needed not only for 
the sake of safety of natural biodiversity, but also to help the Lamarckian organisms survive outside 
the lab. 
Nowadays, even for a non-scientist it seems quite easy to distinguish a living organism from a 
non-living, except probably for viruses, whose status is still questionable. The agreed on definition of 
life, however, does not exist, and the inception of artificial species, in this case, artificial Lamarckian 
species makes it even murkier. It is still unclear whether this implementation will defeat the divinity 
of life or concept of the soul and prove that there is no magic spirit of vitality. Until now, man did not 
manage to create life from scratch, only to manipulate it, so the question remains open. 
The inception of Lamarckian organisms may eliminate some existing philosophical concepts, 
such as free will, because inherited knowledge contradicts its definition, however, what matters is 
the ability to choose which stays put. In this sense, the definition of free will in philosophy might be 
changed or expanded, considering the possibilities that are arising in artificial life. 
This type of research is still rather related to computer science and does not prove or 
disprove the theory of creationism. Therefore, by conducting this kind of studies, we may not 
embrace the concept of God or understand the origins of our species. Also we may not understand 
the relationship between us and the creator any better, as well as find out whether the creator has 




6.2. LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT WORK 
A homogeneous group of strangers is supposed to comprise a focus group. Homogeneity levels the 
playing field and reduces inhibitions among people who will probably never see each other again 
(Eliot & Associates, 2005). Our group has been not entirely homogeneous. The researchers were 
from different fields, and better results would be obtained in a homogeneous group that consists 
entirely of biologists or entirely of philosophers. Also, best results are expected in a group where 
participants do not know each other (Eliot & Associates, 2005), which was not the case with 
participants from computer science. 
Moreover, it takes more than one focus group on any one topic to produce valid results – 
usually three or four. What can demonstrate that enough focus group have been conducted (with 
the same set of questions) is when a moderator does not hear anything new anymore, i.e. reaches a 
point of saturation (Eliot & Associates, 2005). In our case, only one focus group was organized, and it 
surely had its impact on the precision of the results. 
This focus group has provided some good insights, yet this method has some drawbacks. 
Firstly, some participants were not fully prepared for discussing this topic, because the topic itself is 
rather complex and requires at least some level of expertise in the field or closely related fields. 
Secondly, some opinions were outdated (e.g. the statement that artificial life is limited to a rational 
sense of the human being and cannot have spiritual experiences) and the concepts of AI and ALife 
were used as if it was the same thing. Moreover, when it comes to philosophy, without a proper 
preliminary research, the answers of the participants may lack objectivity and can be highly affected 
by personal beliefs (e.g. focusing on the Christian definition of God and not considering any other).  
 
6.3. FUTURE WORK 
Ideally, the qualitative analysis in focus group should be continuous; it only begins in the first focus 
group, and future work will be needed for better precision. The results from the first focus group 
may suggest topics to emphasize or include in later focus groups. For example, based on the initial 
focus group, it is important to determine if central questions are still relevant. In our research, we 
have found that Lamarckian learning is already widely applied in engineering, therefore the question 
whether such implementation is possible has become obsolete. Also such assumptions as Lamarckian 
organisms taking over the world and threatening the well-being of humanity still remain fantasies 
and are too unlikely to happen. What is important for us to know, and what we are going to focus 
our next research on, is the future application of Lamarckian systems in our daily life. Therefore, our 
questionnaire will be changed accordingly. 
In future research, not only we would expand the size of the focus group and conduct more 
groups, but choose more informed and prepared participants, probably using some incentives. Also 
we would like to organize more homogeneous groups instead, such that the participants would be 
from the same field, with the same academic status, and would not know one another (to ensure 
maximum disclosure and better representation of valid opinions). 
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While this dissertation has demonstrated the potential of efficient application of Lamarckian 
learning algorithm, many opportunities for extending the scope of this thesis remain. This section 
presents some of these directions. 
In the last two decades, we have seen the examples of usage of the Lamarckian learning 
algorithm in “soft” artificial life. This research, however, was related exclusively to computer science, 
and the impact of training intelligent agents using Lamarckian learning did not extent beyond the 
artificial environment where it operated. Considering the advances in aforementioned problems, 
Lamarckian learning can be implemented in “hard” and “wet” artificial organisms. This means that it 
can lead to a creation of a physical self-reproducing robot capable of Lamarckian knowledge 
transmission, or a Lamarckian biological organism with artificially engineered DNA (to date, there is 
no evidence that it can be done without using a biological host cell). 
 Recent work in self-replicating systems research includes self-replicating rapid prototypers 
(Freitas et al., 2010), NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts studies on accelerating space exploration 
(Hod & Malone, 2007) and architecture of unmanned lunar factories (Chirikjian et al., 2002), New 
York University artificial DNA tile motifs (Wang et al., 2011) and others. Implementation of 
Lamarckian learning may improve performance of these systems. 
What we can expect from better understanding of life is improved decision making on all 
levels: managing ecological resources, regulating social interactions, planning urban systems, 
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